On 1 January 2025, SIAC implemented the Singapore International Arbitration Centre Rules 2025 (“SIAC Rules”), introducing a major enhancement to its emergency arbitration framework. The most notable innovation is the Protective Preliminary Order (“PPO”), which empowers an Emergency Arbitrator (“EA”) to issue a short-term order on an ex parte basis before notifying the respondent, aimed at preventing conduct that could frustrate the purpose of the requested emergency relief.
While this reform strengthens the efficiency of emergency relief within international arbitration, it raises important procedural questions under Nepalese law, where notice, participation, and equality of treatment are fundamental elements of due process.
THE PPO MECHANISM UNDER THE SIAC RULES
A PPO is a procedural instrument introduced under Schedule 1 of the SIAC Rules. It allows a party to apply for emergency relief even before serving a notice of arbitration, in circumstances where prior notification would defeat the purpose of the relief sought. Once an Emergency Arbitrator is appointed, usually within twenty-four hours, the arbitrator may issue a PPO without prior notice to the respondent if the situation demonstrates urgency and potential irreparable harm.
A PPO operates as a short-term protective measure. It is temporary, lasting for a maximum of fourteen days, and automatically lapses unless confirmed or incorporated into the subsequent Emergency Arbitration Order (“EA Order”) after both parties are heard. The applicant must also notify the respondent within twelve hours of issuance so that the respondent is promptly brought into the process
While ex parte orders of this nature are well established in court adjudication, where Nepal’s Civil Procedure Code 2017 (“CPC”) expressly authorises temporary measures without notice in exceptional circumstances, same may not hold true, in all cases, for arbitration. In arbitral proceedings, the principle of equality of arms governs party conduct, and the Arbitration Act 1999 (“Arbitration Act”) does not envisage any comparable procedure allowing an EA to act without notice. The key issue, therefore, is whether PPOs issued under institutional rules can give rise to procedural concerns under Nepalese law and whether they align with the equality guarantees embedded in the arbitral framework.
EX PARTE INTERIM RELIEF UNDER NEPALESE LAW
In Nepal, ex parte interim measures are primarily a judicial function. The CPC empowers courts to issue temporary or interlocutory orders without notice only in exceptional cases where immediate action is necessary to prevent irreparable harm or preserve the integrity of proceedings. Even then, the CPC requires that the respondent be notified immediately and given an opportunity to contest or seek modification of the order. A hearing must then be held before confirming, altering, or revoking the interim relief. Ex parte orders under the CPC are strictly temporary and conditional. They are permissible only when justified by urgency and followed by prompt adversarial review. While the right of such ex parte interim measure is not present under Arbitration Act. The Arbitration Act permits arbitral tribunals to issue interim measures only after the constitution of the tribunal and prior notice or hearing. Nepalese courts are therefore likely to examine PPOs through the lens of the CPC and question whether the arbitral process offers equivalent safeguards of urgency, notice, and procedural fairness.
PPO AND EQUALITY OF ARMS
The principle of equality of arms lies at the heart of Nepal’s arbitral system. Section 22 of the Arbitration Act, which is based on the Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, requires that both parties be treated equally and afforded a reasonable opportunity to present their case.
The Supreme Court of Nepal, in Hanil Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v Appellate Court, Patan (2075), reaffirmed that any denial of notice or opportunity to be heard violates natural justice and renders an arbitral decision unenforceable. A PPO issued without notice, even if temporary, could therefore may be inconsistent with Nepal’s mandatory procedural standards unless it clearly demonstrates that the respondent’s right to be heard was deferred for necessity and promptly restored.
The key test will be therefore whether the PPO maintains procedural balance by ensuring immediate post-order disclosure and an early hearing. Only then can it be reconciled with the equality requirement under the Arbitration Act. Another issue for the tribunals and court to ponder is whether the fact that both parties have consented to such PPO mechanism will have any bearing on the issue. In other words would prior consent quash any subsequent procedural equality concerns?
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
For Nepal-related arbitrations, the PPO framework presents both practical value and procedural uncertainty. It provides an effective mechanism to prevent imminent harm but sits uneasily within Nepal’s arbitration regime, which does not authorise ex parte arbitral powers.
Parties seeking urgent relief may find greater procedural assurance in using the established ex parte order mechanism under the CPC, which operates within a recognised judicial framework. Where PPOs are nevertheless pursued under the SIAC Rules, counsel should ensure that the application reflects domestic procedural safeguards and sensitivity to prcoedural equality.
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